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Abstract
Firms’ incentives to join up with other fi rms to apply collectively for a single loan are 
studied empirically in this paper. When several fi rms make a joint application for a single 
loan an association of fi rms is created. We identify the associations that had access to 
credit in Belgium over the period 2001-2011 and the fi rms that made up each association, 
observing the amount of credit that both the fi rms and the associations obtained from 
each fi nancial institution they used. We analyse the amount of credit obtained by fi rms 
according to whether or not they belonged to an association, the likelihood of fi rms forming 
associations, the impact of belonging to an association on the amount of credit fi rms receive 
from banks and the effect of fi rms not obtaining any direct credit on the amount obtained 
by the associations formed by such fi rms. We also analyse whether associations formed by 
common-ownership fi rms are able to access more credit than other associations. We fi nd 
that large and long-established fi rms are more likely to join up with other fi rms to make joint 
loan applications and that associations obtain more credit if all their members use the same 
bank as the association does to obtain credit. Furthermore, the lower a fi rm’s credit over the 
previous year, the more likely it is to form an association to obtain credit, and we show that 
associations comprising small fi rms with no credit history are especially credit constrained.
Keywords: associations, fi nance, access to credit, relationship banking, Belgium.
JEL classifi cation: G21, G30.
Resumen
El artículo analiza empíricamente los incentivos de distintas empresas a unirse para pedir 
un préstamo de manera conjunta. Cuando distintas empresas se unen para pedir un único 
préstamo, estas constituyen una asociación. Identifi camos las asociaciones que tuvieron 
acceso al crédito en Bélgica durante 2001-2011 y las empresas que crearon cada 
asociación, observando el montante del crédito que obtuvieron tanto las empresas como 
las asociaciones por parte de cada institución fi nanciera que utilizaron. Analizamos la 
cuantía del crédito obtenido por las empresas cuando pertenecen o no a una asociación, 
la probabilidad de que las empresas creen una asociación, el impacto de pertenecer a una 
asociación sobre la suma del crédito que obtienen las empresas, así como la consecuencia de 
no obtener crédito directamente sobre la cantidad de crédito que obtienen las asociaciones 
creadas por estas empresas. Asimismo, analizamos si las asociaciones creadas por 
empresas que tienen vínculos de propiedad entre ellas tienen acceso a mayores volúmenes 
de crédito que el resto de asociaciones. El artículo muestra que las empresas más antiguas 
y grandes tienen una mayor probabilidad de crear asociaciones para pedir préstamos, y 
que las asociaciones obtienen más crédito si todos sus miembros constituyentes usan el 
mismo banco que usa la asociación. Además, la probabilidad de una empresa de crear una 
asociación aumenta cuanto menor sea el volumen de crédito que obtuvo el año pasado, y 
las asociaciones creadas por empresas pequeñas sin ninguna historia de crédito tienen un 
acceso a este especialmente restringido.
Palabras clave: asociaciones, fi nanciación, acceso al crédito, relaciones bancarias, Bélgica.
Códigos JEL: G21, G30.
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1 Introduction
The most common methods firms use to finance themselves are through their owners’ own
capital contribution, debt financing or equity financing. However, when firms choose to fi-
nance through acquiring debt they can still decide whether to engage in a direct individual
loan with a financial institution or join some other firm(s) to collectively apply for credit
which later may be divided among the participants. Several firms may join and collectively
apply for a loan to any financial institution, where all the associations’ members will be
liable for repayment, creating thus an association of firms. An association of firms is defined
as a union of firms which are jointly liable as co-debtors of a same loan. Thus, members of
any association share a united and undivided responsibility towards third parties they have
dealt with. However, these associations do not constitute any legal entity. In this research
we focus on associations which have obtained credit from any financial institution.
If several firms apply together for a common loan to be shared ex-post among them,
they might obtain better financing conditions than aggregating the requirements each firm
individually would have to fulfill had they applied separately for several loans. Besides, it
may well be the case that several firms apply for a common loan to jointly finance a common
project, such as large building sites or highways. The better conditions they might obtain
applying as one unit may possibly be due to a lower aggregate risk it represents for the
financial institution conceding the loan, since all firms guaranteeing the loan are responsible
to repay the loan as well as its interests implying that the risk of default is widespread
among several debtors, i.e. there are coinsurance gains. Thus, given the lower default risk
and consequently the higher the loan’s repayment probability, the financial institution might
concede better credit conditions to the unique loan all firms secure compared to the con-
ditions it would demand if loans were applied (and thus secured) individually. Therefore,
these positive financial synergies might encourage firms to apply together for a loan, creating
associations of firms. However, there exist some drawbacks to constituting associations to
jointly apply for credit, mainly related to firms’ mistrust and moral hazard, or to the risk
that the benefits of a good project might be outweighed by the loses of a poorly performing
project.
Firms might not be able to distinguish between firms that represent a positive opportu-
nity to apply for credit with, and firms that would like to found an association, which due
to their negative outlook or poor performance, they are not individually eligible for credit
and have no other option to obtain credit but to joining other better-performing firms to
jointly apply. Thus, firms looking for partners to set up an association might face adverse
selection and not be able to separate “good” from “bad” firms to engage with because of
asymmetric information, which might discourage firms to establish associations forgoing the
potential benefits it may bring.
The literature on bank credit has extensively focused on firms’ credit access and on its
conditions such as its price in terms of interest rate (see e.g. the seminal paper of Petersen
and Rajan (1994), Cole (1998) and more recently Berger et al. (2014)) and non-price terms
such as existence and nature of collateral or maturity (see e.g. Berger and Udell (1995),
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Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000)), but few has been studied about associations of firms
demanding for credit, specially empirically due to the limited access to data covering this
subject. For instance, Leland (2007) provides a theoretical comparison between firms’ ex-
pected profits under separate and joint financing of different activities depending on these
activities’ default costs, tax rates, relative sizes, correlation, and riskiness of their expected
cash flows. Similarly, Banal-Estanol et al. (2013) theoretically study the conditions on ex-
pected returns, riskiness and default costs of potential projects several firms would like to
finance, to determine whether it is preferable for a firm to individually apply for a loan to
finance its own project or jointly applying with other firms to finance all projects with a
unique loan. They establish that when an individually financed project does not yield a re-
turn sufficiently high to pay back the financial obligations it engaged to respect, the project
automatically fails, while if a project is jointly financed with other projects, an individual
project will fail if the average yield of all projects is lower than the financial obligation. Thus,
they show that a well performing project might fail due to risk contamination and a poorly
performing project might prevail thanks to coinsurance gains. Besides, they state that un-
der some circumstances separate financing is more profitable even if the interest rate of the
jointly financing option is lower. Similarly, Inderst and Muller (2003) theoretically examine
firms’ costs and benefits to raise funds, either separately to finance each project individually
or merging contracts through a headquarter to finance multiple projects, concluding that
grouping financially constrained firms’ projects might lead to an increased access to credit.
Subramanian and Tung (2016) conduct a cross-country comparative analysis about the
number of project finance loans granted in different countries with different corporate and
bankruptcy laws, concluding that borrowers make more use of project finance loans than
“regular corporate loans” in countries where laws concerning creditor rights are loose, where
project finance loans are defined as financing evaluated upon the expected cash flows derived
from the project it is intended to finance and not upon the participating agents’ solvency.
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) reach similar conclusions stating that project finance loans
are more common than other loans in countries with a high level of economical and political
risk, such as non-OECD countries. Ambrus-Lakatos and Hege (2012) focus on internal capi-
tal markets to theoretically show that the contagion effect prevails over the coinsurance gains
in volatile firms while the contrary holds in stable firms, since whenever a several illiquidity
shock hits one department it might drag down money from profitable projects in other de-
partments. They show that in the case of a strong negative illiquidity shock conglomerates
usually perform worse than individual and independent firms. However, conglomerates or
centralization might bring other advantages such as a higher access to credit since the risk
of non-repayment of an individual project is lower (Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005) and
Inderst and Muller (2003)).
Hann et al. (2013) study the benefits of coinsurance –defined as imperfectly correlated
cash flows– to obtain cheaper credit. They show that if a given firm’s business units have
imperfectly correlated cash flows, the firm can benefit from a lower systemic risk (emergence
of coinsurance gains) and therefore obtain cheaper credit than otherwise. They empirically
show that firms operating in diversified areas benefit from a lower credit price than firms
concentrated in a single market.
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Dimitrov and Tice (2006) also focus on the differences between diversified and non-
diversified firms, concluding that non-diversified firms’ sales and inventory rate growth fall
significantly more than the ones of diversified firms during economic recessions, basing their
study on three recessions that arose between 1978 and 1996. Similarly, Kuppuswamy and
Villalonga (2010) focus on the financial crisis of 2008 to show that conglomerated firms had
more access to credit than comparable individual firms due to the debt coinsurance provided
by the conglomerate. The paper acknowledges that coinsurance gains become specially more
valuable during crisis periods. In line with these findings, Yan et al. (2010) covering the
period 1985-1997 show that diversified firms profit from a higher access to credit in external
markets compared to single-segmented firms, and that when the cost of external financing
increases, diversified firms are less affected than non-diversified firms in terms of amounts
borrowed, since they have the possibility to substitute external financing with access to in-
ternal financing.
In the present paper light is shed on Belgian established firms’ access to credit as a
determinant of their likelihood to create associations, and the paper is organized as follows:
section 1 has provided the introduction and the literature review, section 2 explains the
hypotheses and the empirical strategy used throughout the paper, section 3 presents the
data description, section 4 shows the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Hypotheses and empirical strategy
The main goal of this study is to pin down the causes and the conditions under which some
firms join other firms to apply collectively for credit through the creation of associations. In
order to do so, we hereafter expose several hypothesis and the empirical methodology we use
to test them.
First, we argue whether firms in need of credit create more associations, since it might be
that firms which have not had much access to credit over the last year look for alternative
ways to have credit. Indeed, one of this alternatives is to create associations, so we claim
that firms which have had few credit over the last year are more likely to create associations.
Similarly, it is accustomed (and in Section 4 in Table 5 it is shown that it is indeed the
case) that big firms have higher credit needs than smaller firms, so we also discuss whether
firms’ size positively influences the likelihood to create associations to satisfy bigger firms’
higher credit demands. Apart from that, we are interested to discover whether the amount
of direct credit a firm obtains from a bank is influenced by the fact that the firm belongs
to an association which gets credit from the same bank, since if that was the case it could
imply that the lending relation a firm keeps with a bank gets affected if the firm uses the
bank for different services.
A key fact when firms create associations is their decision to increase or decrease the
credit amount they individually demand to their lenders. If during the time a firm belongs
to an association the credit it gets directly from a bank increases, we could conclude that
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the firm receives credit through the association as a way to complement the credit it gets
directly since it might not get enough directly, so it creates an association to compensate
the credit it needs but does not receive directly. However, if the total direct credit a firm
acquires during the period it belongs to an association decreases, we could argue that the
firm uses the credit it receives through an association as a substitute to the credit it would
have obtained if it did not create an association.
Besides, it seems reasonable to argue that a bank is more prone to awarding credit to an
association composed of firms which are already the bank’s customers than to an association
composed of firms which the bank has never done business with. The fact that the bank
knows the firms behind the association and has access to their private or soft information
due to its previous interaction with them (Cole (1998)) might imply that the bank does not
have to monitor those firms as much as otherwise, or that during the process of applying
for credit less documentation and references are requested since it might be that the bank
had already asked for those requirements before in time, simplifying the process and thus
organizational costs. Moreover, Cole (1998) concludes that a lender is more likely to provide
credit to a firm with which it has already an existing relationship (in terms of number of
financial services the firm uses from the lender) than to a potentially new borrower. Besides,
the higher the amount of information the higher the ability of the bank to better assess
the association’s members’ creditworthiness and as a consequence the association’s financial
strength as a whole. Then, the fact that every member of an association uses for credit
purposes the bank the association to which they belong gets credit from, allows the bank
to obtain more information about the firms forming the association. The supplementary
information the bank has access to due to the personal interaction it keeps with the firms
lowers the existing information asymmetry between the association and the bank, and thus
the risk of the loan granted to the association. Besides, a lender’s access to a debtor’s soft
information reduces the debtor’s financial constrains (Berger et al. (2005)). Therefore, we
expect the association to be less financially constrained if all its members use the same bank
the association uses, consequently expecting a higher access to credit by that association,
ceteris paribus.
The credit an association gets might also be motivated by the fact that none of the firms
that built it up has access to credit individually and thus by the fact that these firms can
just get credit through forming associations. In that case we would expect the association to
receive less credit than otherwise mainly for two reasons. First, firms which do not get any
credit directly might indeed not need much credit; and second, firms which do not get any
credit directly might not be creditworthy enough to get it. Therefore and in any case, we
would expect that associations formed by these firms get less credit than associations formed
by firms which have access to direct credit. This negative effect might be exacerbated by
the amount of private information firms have, since the less the information available about
a firm the higher the risk it represents to grant it a loan. Given that small firms have on
average a higher amount of private information than big firms (Berger et al. (2005)), we
expect that associations made up of small firms which do not have access to direct credit
during the time they belong to an association suffer from a more severe restriction of credit
than associations made up of big firms without access to direct credit.
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In order to estimate firms’ likelihood to create associations and the amount of total credit
firms and associations obtain during a year from each bank they use, we propose and test
three equations.
We estimate a logistic model by maximum likelihood (Eq. 1) where we regress the
indicator variable BTAi,t (Belong To Association) –which takes value equal 1 if firm i belongs
to at least one association in year t, and 0 otherwise– on the log of the total amount of direct
credit the firm obtained during the previous year, and a vector of control variables zi:
P (BTAi,t = 1) =
1
1 + exp(−(α + β · log(crediti,t−1) + δ · zi,t−1)) (1)
We estimate a model (Eq. 2) where we regress the size of firm i’s credit from bank b in
year t –the natural logarithm of the credit obtained by a firm during a year from a given
bank– on a firm’s predicted probabilities to belongs to an association in year t, and a vector
of control variables zi:
log(crediti,b,t) = α + β ·̂BTAi,t + δ · zi,t−1 + it (2)
Given the simultaneity concern that would arise if the variable BTA was included as
an explanatory variable in Eq. 2 as well as dependent variable in Eq. 1, we predict firms’
probabilities to create and belong to an association and use these fitted values as regressors
in Eq. 2. In Section 2.1 this procedure is further explained in detail.
We estimate a model (Eq. 3) where we regress the credit an association a obtains from
bank b in year t –the natural logarithm of the credit obtained by an association during a
year from a given bank– on a binary variable denoting whether every association’s member
received no direct credit in year t, and a vector of control variables za. Moreover, in order to
consider the fact that the lack of credit might affect in a different manner associations made
up by firms of different sizes, we interact the dummy accounting for whether an association’s
members got direct credit in year t with the log of the association’s members’ average assets
measured in year t− 1:
log(credita,b,t) = α+β ·(members no credita,t∗log(members avg assetsa,t−1))+δ ·za,t−1+at
(3)
The vector zi includes a set of firm-specific variables, industry, region and time fixed ef-
fects to account for cross-industry, cross-regional heterogeneity and the economic fluctuations
occurred during the time period under consideration. The vector za includes the average of
associations’ members’ some firm-specific variables such as the average of members’ assets or
age and also industry, region and time fixed effects. In Eq. 2 and Eq. 3 the vector of control
variables zi and za, respectively, also include bank fixed effects to control for heterogeneity
across banks used to get credit from.
Firm-specific variables encompass firms’ age, value of assets, number of different banks
used, return on assets, a firm’s profits’ variability measured by the standard deviation of its
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returns on assets over the entire period we consider and the ratio between a firm’s fixed as-
sets over its total assets to account for the “collaterialisable assets” a firm has at its disposal
(as defined by Michaelas et al. (1999)). Besides, we control for the number of firms that are
in each firm’s industry, region, and both in their industry and region together. The vector
za includes some association-specific variables regarding characteristics of its members and
information about the association. Some of these variables are indicators to assess whether
its members operate in the same activity or are located in the same region, the number of
firms constituting the association, the number of different banks the association uses, and its
members’ average amount of assets, assets structure, age and return on assets, measured at
a yearly level. Besides, the model used to estimate the credit obtained by associations (Eq.
3) includes variables to account for whether some member of an association has created an-
other association before having created the one to which it currently belongs to, and whether
all members of an association get credit from the same bank the association to which they
belong gets credit from.
The number of banks a firm or an association uses might proxy a high level of leverage
or a positive quality signal they want to show to other banks (Ogawa et al. (2007)). We
include this variable into the aforementioned three equations to control for the credit and
diversification needs firms or associations might have, since when using several sources they
might obtain on average more or less credit from each of them compared to other firms or
associations using less sources. On the one hand, if they obtain less credit from each of
the several sources they use a possible conclusion could be that they use many sources to
diversify their credit income and not to depend solely on few sources, so they divide their
credit requirements into several banks. On the contrary, it could be that they receive less
credit from each of the sources they use because the value of the debtor’s private or soft
information for each creditor is inversely proportional to the number of creditors a debtor
uses (Cole (1998) and Jimenez and Saurina (2004)), so each source decides to provide less
credit given that the information it has about the firm/association is worth less, implying
that the debtor needs to use more sources to compensate it. On the other hand, if a firm or
association receives more credit from each source when using several sources, one possible
conclusion could be that either the firm or the association is very creditworthy and it can
diversify its credit needs using several banks without having its credit flow reduced from
each of the banks. Alternatively, it could be that the firm/association needs high amounts
of credit which no individual bank wholly provides and it therefore uses many lenders from
which it gets on average more credit than debtors using fewer banks do.
Some firms create associations several times as an alternative way of obtaining credit.
Then, we consider whether having created an association before in time helps to explain
the amount of credit the association receives, since the fact of having created an association
by the time the firm creates another association might reduce the uncertainty other firms
might face when creating an association for the first time. Then, we contemplate that an
association which one of its member has created at least another association before in time
might benefit from a favourable treatment due to at least one of the association’s firms’
experience at creating associations.1
1Experience at creating association might help to comply faster or more efficiently all the paperwork
required by the bank or being more productive at creating the association, which reduces the time span
between the time in which the application for credit is done until the date in which the loan is granted.
2
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Khanna and Palepu (2000), in some way similar to the present article, study the effect
of business groups on firms’ performance in India.2 They analyze whether the performance
of affiliated Indian firms significantly differs from the performance of non-affiliated Indian
firms. They regress through ordinary least squares firms’ performance (continuous variable)
on a dummy indicating whether the firm is a member of a group. Other covariates include
firm-specific variables (such as age and size) and industry dummies. This econometric speci-
fication is similar to the one used in the present paper where group membership is similar to
belonging to an association, and while Khanna and Palepu (2000) study firm performance
depending on belonging to a business group, we study a firm’s amount of accessed credit
depending on belonging to an association. We also analyze this relationship using ordinary
least squares. Nevertheless, Khanna and Palepu (2000) do not study the probability of an
Indian firm to belong to a group. Thus, they do not face the possibility to face endogeneity
due to simultaneity as in the present paper.3
Nevertheless, similar to Khanna and Palepu (2000), we study whether associations cre-
ated by firms which hold shares of each other obtain higher amounts of credit than associa-
tions set-up by independently owned firms. This is motivated by the fact that firms under
the same ownership structure might face less moral hazard, and have access to both hard
and soft financial information about the other firms. Independent firms might find it more
difficult to avoid moral hazard and to have full information about the other firms’ financial
situation. Thus, associations created by co-owned firms might be more creditworthy than as-
sociations created by independent firms and consequently, banks might be willing to provide
more credit to associations created by firms sharing the same ownership structure. Besides,
when formalizing the credit, it may also be easier to negotiate with the bank if there is one
same owner for every firm constituting the association, reducing bureaucratic costs, which
may translate into higher credit granting.
Given that we have a panel data at our disposal we use fixed- and between-effects linear
model to study the determinants of the amount of credit obtained by firms and associations
over time. Even if random-effects linear model is more efficient than fixed-effects because
it generally creates estimates with lower standard errors and it therefore provides more
precise measurements, if the assumption of random-effects (it assumes that the model is
well-specified and if there are omitted time-invariant variables that those are uncorrelated
with the regressors included in the model) are not satisfied, the parameter estimates may
be biased. After running the Hausman specification (Hausman (1978)) where the fixed-
2From Khanna and Palepu (2000):“Indian business groups are collections of publicly traded firms in a
wide variety of industries, with a significant amount of common ownership and control, usually by a family.”
3Moreover, due to the confidentiality of the data used throughout the present paper, to the best of our
knowledge, a similar research question has not been tackled in the literature and thus the methodology nor
the results obtained cannot be directly compared to similar studies.
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effects and random-effects estimators are compared when estimating Eq. 2, we obtain that
both models’ estimators significantly differ (see Appendix C). Then, it is better to use a
consistent and unbiased model (fixed-effects) which is not efficient than using random-effects
model which is efficient but not unbiased.4 However, in order to quantify the effect of time-
invariant variables that fixed-effects models do not estimate but only control for, we use
between-effects. Then, we use a fixed-effects model to account for possible time-invariant
omitted variables in the model focusing on the within-individual variation, and between-
effects to estimate the effects of observed time-invariant variables exploiting the differences
between individuals. We use cluster-robust covariance estimators when using fixed-effects so
each individual is treated as a cluster and we control for potential heteroscedasticity and/or
serial correlation. Further, given that endogeneity due to simultaneity might also arise in
our framework we cover this issue in the next section.
2.1 Endogeneity due to simultaneity
We do have an endogeneity problem due to simultaneity since we consider that the decision
to create and belong to an association is an explanatory variable to determine the amount
of credit a firm receives from a given bank. At the same time, a key determinant of firms’
likelihood to belong to an association is the amount of outstanding credit the firm has along
the previous year with every bank it used. Therefore, when firms decide the amount of credit
they want to use they take into consideration whether they belong or not to an association,
since depending on whether they have other sources of credit income they might request
more or less credit directly. Then, as firms decide both the amount of credit they would like
to use and the decision to create an association, the latter is an endogenous decision when
we estimate the former decision. The effect of existence of endogeneity when using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) is that the coefficients’ estimates are biased, hence not allowing the
researcher to identify the effect of interest.
In order to reduce the presence of endogeneity an Instrumental Variable approach is an
option which allows to correct the estimates removing their bias if the identifying assump-
tion of the IV approach are correct. An instrument is a variable that explains or predicts
the endogeneous variable and which is exogenous to the main equation. In the present case,
we would need an instrument that explains a firm’s decision to create and to belong to an
association which is at the same time not related to the firm’s decision of how much credit
it applies for. Unfortunately, we have not found such a valid instrument. Another alter-
native is to predict firms’ probabilities of creating an association and using these predicted
probabilities instead of the endogenous variable as a regressor on firms’ decisions to apply
for credit. If we were to predict firms’ probabilities of creating an association by means of
non-linear models (such as probit or logit) due to firms’ dichotomous decision of creating an
association (either they create it or not), and plug these predicted values into the main equa-
tion to estimate the determinants of firms’ decisions to apply for given amounts of credit, we
would be incurring in the so-called “forbidden regression” as first termed by Jerry Hausman
4See Allison (2009) and Cameron and Trivedi (2010) for further description and differences between
fixed-effects and other comparable models.
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in 1975 (Angrist and Pischke (2009) p.190). This approach of predicting probabilities in the
first stage using non-linear methods and plugging them into a second stage equation which
is estimated by linear methods (OLS) produces inconsistent estimates (Angrist and Pischke
(2009) p.190 and Wooldridge (2002a) section 15.7.3 on p. 477). The source for the incon-
sistency is that a non-linear regression does not generate fitted values that are uncorrelated
with the residuals, so a linear regression might be used in the first stage in order to correct
for this inconsistency, even in presence of a dummy endogenous variable, since only in the
case where the non-linear model is perfectly specified (not realistic in practice) it generates
consistent estimates (Angrist and Krueger (2001)). Angrist (2001) also states that even if
the endogenous variable is binary, a non-linear first stage creates inconsistent estimates and
that therefore it is “safer” to use a linear model first-stage.
Therefore, there exists a trade-off between using linear and non-linear models in the first
stage. Using a linear regression model, the estimates behind the variables will be consistent
but also less efficient than what they would be if a non-linear model were used to take into
account the binary dimension of the dependent variable. In order to keep consistency and
in line with the suggestions of the literature, a linear first and second stage model is carried
out in this study.
The first stage consists of estimating firms’ predicted probabilities of creating associa-
tions, and these probabilities are estimated through the Linear Probability Model (LPM).
Given that the decision to create an association is modelled as a binary response variable,
the expected value of this dependent variable is interpreted as a probability, and the proba-
bility of creating an association is a linear function of the explanatory variables, so a linear
regression model such as OLS can be used to estimate the parameters.
However, the use of LPM to predict the probabilities of creating an association in a first
stage presents some drawbacks too. The literature recognizes mainly four weaknesses (see
Long (1997) p. 38-40). First, as its name states, the LPM estimates linear probabilities, that
is, the probability of creating an association is linearly related to the explanatory variables
which might be continuous, so increasing the value of the independent variables might pos-
sibly lead the probability of a positive outcome to be higher than one, which is not possible
in practice. By the same reasoning, it is plausible that the value of a predicted probability
falls below zero. Second and related to the previous reasoning, the linearity form of the LPM
implies that an increase of an explanatory variable entails a constant change in the prob-
ability of the event independently of the explanatory variable’s level. It does not account
for the fact that the predictors might have diminishing partial effects as the probability of a
positive event approaches the unity. In the present case, the linearity of the function implies
that say, an increase of one million in the value of a firm’s assets has the same effect on the
probability that firm to create an association if the firm has zero assets or assets worth a
hundred million euros. This is a strong limitation of the LPM for situations in which di-
minishing marginal returns do exist. Third, as the dependent variable is binary, whether to
create an association or not, the conditional variance of the binary variable is not constant,
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implying that the errors are heteroskedastic.5 As a consequence, the estimator is inefficient
and the standard errors are biased, which affects the test statistics and may lead to incorrect
conclusions arguing that a coefficient before a variable is statistically significant when it is
not (Type I error), or vice versa (Type II error). Fourth and last, the residuals arising after
a regression run by LPM are not normally distributed, since the residual is the distance
between the observed value and the expected value of the dependent variable. As the depen-
dent variable can just take two values, the residual can also only take two values, breaking
the residuals’ normality assumption. As a consequence, when dealing with small samples
the distributions based on residuals’ normality assumption such as the t-test are not reliable.
Nevertheless, some of the drawbacks of the LPM can be controlled for when using it
for estimation purposes. According to the first critique that the predicted values might fall
outside the unit interval, Wooldridge (2002b) states on p. 236 that “predicted probabilities
outside the unit interval are a little troubling when we want to make predictions, but this
is rarely central to an analysis”. Indeed and as it is the case in the present study, firms’
predicted probabilities of creating associations are not used to state any result directly nor
to make any prediction, they are used to get rid of the endogeneity problem when estimating
firms’ decisions to apply for a given amount of credit. Regarding to the second critique
about the constant marginal partial effects, even if this feature eases the coefficients’ in-
terpretations since they do not depend on the predictors’ values and Angrist and Pischke
(2009) state on p. 107 that in practice marginal effects computed with linear and non-linear
models are “similar”, we do not interpret these values since once again, it is not the aim
of the analysis and the values are only used as predictors in another second stage equation.
With regards to the third and fourth critique related to residuals’ heteroskedasticity and the
violation of their normality assumption, we correct it by running the LPM implementing
the Huber-White sandwich estimator to estimate robust standard errors, which deals with
heteroskedasticity and non-normality concerns. Besides, we are not constrained to deal with
a small sample. Anyway, realize that estimates obtained through OLS remain BLUE (best
linear unbiased estimator) even when the errors are not normally distributed (nor they need
to be independent and identically distributed), since they only need to be uncorrelated with
mean zero and have constant variance (homoscedasticity), as indicated by the Gauss-Markov
theorem.
Hence, we apply the LPM considering and controlling for the critiques it is subject to,
in order to deal with the endogeneity issue that arises in Eq. 2. Furthermore, Wooldridge
(2002b) states on p. 236 about the LPM that “even with these (aforementioned) problems,
the linear probability model is useful and often applied in economics”. Moreover, Wooldridge
(2002a) on p. 468 in Table 15.1 provides an example where labor force participation (bi-
nary variable since either a person works or does not work) is estimated through linear and
non-linear models (LPM, Logit and Probit) and it is stated that coefficients’ signs and sta-
tistical validity are the same across models. Angrist and Pischke (2009) on p. 106 in Table
3.4.2 provide another example where they show the marginal effects of several explanatory
5For a binary variable y with mean μ, the variance of y is μ(1 − μ). Hence, the conditional variance
V ar(y|x) = xβ(1− xβ) depends on the regressors implying that the variance of the errors is not constant.
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variables on the effect of childbearing on mothers’ labor supply, stating that marginal effects
obtained through linear and non-linear methods are similar. In the literature, Basinger and
Ensley (2010) study the effect of the US President’s public appearances on the success of
his proposals, where presidents’ decisions about which public appearances to be involved at
is related to success since they make the decisions strategically, so public appearances are
endogenous to success. They control for the endogeneity using the LPM as a first stage
to estimate predicted probabilities of public appearances (dichotomous variable) which are
then used in a second stage equation to estimate its level of success (continuous variable).
Other four models are used to deal with the existing endogeneity problem and the paper
provides a comparison between these models’ results. Lundberg et al. (1999) study assis-
tance policies to African families which experience an adult’s death. They argue that there
exists endogeneity between these variables since a household’s adult’s death is related to
the household’s socio-economic conditions, which affects the assistance the household would
receive in case of an adult’s death, in terms of timing and amount of private transfers and
public assistance. Their econometric analysis includes a first stage LPM of a household’s
adult death and a second stage estimation where the fitted values from the first stage are
used. In the present paper we follow a similar approach where in the first stage we estimate
a LPM of firms’ probabilities of creating an association and in a second stage we use these
predicted probabilities to estimate the amount of credit they apply for.
When we obtain the predicted probabilities in the first stage when estimating firms’
probabilities to create an association using a LPM, around 4% of the predicted probabilities
fall below zero, that is, they have a negative predicted probability to create an association.
This is one of the potential problems that might arise when a LPM is used to estimate
predicted probabilities, namely that some predictions fall outside the unit interval. However,
the aim of these predictions is not related to their interpretation but to use them as regressors
in a second stage equation where firms’ decision to apply for given amounts of credit is
analyzed.6 Besides, as Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) state, the LPM remains unbiased and
consistent if the number of predicted probabilities falling outside the unit interval is very
few or none, while the bias increases with the relative proportion of predicted probabilities
taking values lower than zero and higher than one. As in our case the values outside the
unit interval represent only around 4% of all predicted probabilities, it does not create a
significant problem.
3 Data description
We use several databases to cover all the information we exploit in the empirical analy-
sis. The most determinant for our study is the Belgian Central Corporate Credit Register
(CCCR) which registers relevant information about credit awarded by every financial insti-
6We have also run the second stage equation without considering the observations for which the predicted
probabilities are negative in the first stage, and results are qualitatively identical, mainly due to the few
number of observations dropped.
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tutions established in Belgium for business purposes.7 Every credit institution located in
Belgium has to report to the CCCR information on a monthly basis on the amount of credit
extended, amount of ongoing debt, the identities of the borrowers, initial duration of the
credit extended and its remaining length for each ongoing or new loan. These information
are collected, managed and used by the National Bank of Belgium for mainly financial reg-
ulatory and stability purposes.
From the Belgian Central Corporate Credit Register we obtain information about all pri-
vate loans awarded by every credit institution established in Belgium since 2001 until 2011
to any firm or groups of firms, established in Belgium or abroad, which credit exposure with
respect to the bank is at least 25,000 e. We have access both to the maximum authorized
monthly credit the firm might have access to and to the actual monthly credit the firm uses
from each loan it gets. For our analyses we use the maximum authorized credit since it rep-
resents the amount of credit the bank is willing to grant to the firm. Besides, the duration of
each loan and the identity of the firm and the financial institution which grants it are known,
which allows us to follow the credit relation a firm keeps with all the different banks it might
use over time. Therefore, we identify the number of banks firms use at each time and the
total credit the firm has access to from all its credit sources. Moreover, there is the same
information available for associations made up of firms, so we exploit the authorized credit
they obtain, the sources they use and the time frame over which they obtain credit. Last,
we concentrate on legal persons established in Belgium8 and disregard firms and associations
which even if they receive credit from a financial institution established in Belgium, they are
located abroad and thus they do not have a Belgian postal code. Moreover, a second database
we have access to, the Belgian Central Balance Sheet Office, provides no information regard-
ing these firms, so we would not be able to control for these firms’ characteristics in any case.
The CCCR also allows us to identify the firms that joined associations between 2001
and 2011, so we can observe the direct credit those firms obtained during the time they
belonged to associations and the credit associations got. Furthermore, we can note whether
firms creating an association use the same bank the association uses to get credit from and
the number of associations firms create over time. A limitation of our data is that we can-
not disentangle the distribution of credit within associations, i.e. we cannot single out the
credit each firm within an association receives from the credit the association gets as a whole.
Apart from that, we have access to the Belgian Central Balance Sheet Office which col-
lects the balance sheets of every firm established and operating in Belgium between 2001 and
2011 so we can use several variables such as their size, profitability, industry or activity they
7Loans to individuals for exclusively private purposes are registered in another database, namely the
Central Individual Credit Register.
8Even if the focus of the present paper is on associations of firms and not on associations of natural
persons nor on associations of natural and legal persons, it should be noted for completeness that around
four fifth of associations in the plain data are constituted by both natural and legal persons, and that half of
these associations are composed of uniquely one natural and one legal person. This probably connotes that
business owners create an association with the firm they own, probably to pledge a higher collateral to the
credit the firm is willing to obtain. We leave the analysis of this fact for further research.
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are focused at and their geographical location. In order to control for firms’ industries and
location we use the first two digits of the NACE code and the first two out of the four digits
of the postal code they report in their balance sheets, respectively, not to focus on industry
niches or too small geographical areas. However, not every firm is obliged to file their annual
accounts with the National Bank of Belgium, so we disregard firms included in the database
which are sufficiently small not to be legally forced to prepare financial statements and file
them with the National Bank of Belgium, given that these firms do not report some financial
information necessary to our analysis, such as their level of assets.
In Table 1 the number of associations which members belong to the same industry (mea-
sured with the two digit NACE code) and/or to the same area (measured with the two digit
postcode) are shown. We observe that 65.59% of associations are made up by firms all lo-
cated in the same region and around 2/3 of associations (5,000/7,484) are made up by firms
which do not all operate in the same industry. The number of observations used in Table 1 is
7,484, which corresponds to the number of different associations in the sample which all its
members have non-missing industry and postal code information. In this study we consider
81 different Belgian two digit postcodes and 87 different two digit NACE codes. We observe
372,992 different firms over the period 2001-2011, out of which 73,434 different firms create
69,527 different associations. Only 7,484 associations have non-missing information and are
used for the analysis. These 7,484 associations account for 16,249 observations, i.e. each
association is observed on average for 2.17 years, and each of the 372,992 different firms we
analyze is observed for 3.94 years on average, which sum up to 1,470,557 observations.
We also have at our disposal data about Belgian firms’ holdings on other Belgian firms,
so we can observe Belgian firms’ ownership of other Belgian firms. This information allows
us to detect whether an association is formed by firms which are co-owned among them.
We observe the identity of the firm who owns shares of other firms, the identity of the firm
whose shares are held, the number of shares the holder owns of the held company, and the
proportion of the held company’s equity these shares represent, for each year between 2001
and 2011. This information is provided by the Belgian firms themselves in their annual
accounts.
Nevertheless, the data presents some limitations, given that it does not allow to identify
whether firms which do not have direct ownership links belong to a same conglomerate of
firms. Thus, we can only note whether one firm is partially or completely owned by another
firm in certain years and then identify whether they have created an association during
that period. Equally, we are able to identify whether any two firms within an association
have ownership links between themselves. Unfortunately, we are not able to discern whether
firms which have no direct ownership link between themselves belong to a same conglomerate.
Given that firms’ balance sheet information is measured at a yearly level we annualize
our monthly credit data in such a way that we have the total authorized credit a firm has ob-
tained from each bank it uses over a year (from January to December). In Table 2 and Table
3 a descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis are provided, regarding
firms and associations, respectively. Definitions of these variables are provided in Appendix
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Table 1: Number of associations which members are in the same activity and/or region.
same region
same activity No Yes Total
No 1,730 3,270 5,000
34.60% 65.40% 100.00
Yes 845 1,639 2,484
34.02% 65.98% 100.00
Total 2,575 4,909 7,484
34.41% 65.59% 100.00
A in Table 8. As we lag some of our variables for one period (year) to avoid reverse causality
in our estimations and the year 2001 is the first year available in our data, descriptive statis-
tics for that year are omitted. Besides and as a explanatory note, the variables starting with
“lag” regard to the values that variable took the year before, i.e. lag log avg assets in 2011
regard to the value of log avg assets in 2010. Then, for every lagged variable we consider, we
show the values used in the regression at time t, which correspond to the variables’ values
at time t-1.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of firms’ variables used in the regression of probability to create associations,
by year
YEAR 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
VARIABLES mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
belong to association 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28
lag log total assets 13.10 1.41 13.09 1.39 13.09 1.38 13.11 1.37 13.15 1.37
log total credit last year 7.34 1.58 7.35 1.56 7.34 1.58 7.35 1.59 7.38 1.58
lag log number region industry 4.71 1.35 4.70 1.34 4.72 1.33 4.75 1.33 4.76 1.32
lag log number industry 8.72 1.17 8.73 1.16 8.75 1.15 8.78 1.15 8.80 1.14
lag log number region 7.96 0.73 7.95 0.72 7.97 0.72 7.99 0.71 8.01 0.71
lag number banks used 1.30 0.66 1.30 0.66 1.26 0.58 1.26 0.57 1.26 0.57
lag asset structure 0.49 0.31 0.49 0.31 0.50 0.31 0.50 0.31 0.50 0.31
lag leverage 8.10 1,062.23 9.28 1,292.79 3.83 1,165.47 3.64 595.86 7.67 875.29
lag log age 2.31 0.79 2.33 0.79 2.35 0.79 2.37 0.79 2.39 0.79
lag roa -0.06 11.29 -0.44 153.01 -0.00 1.54 -0.37 148.29 -0.00 2.82
lag roa std dev 3.91 768.50 3.98 757.41 3.78 744.04 2.36 520.67 2.01 503.21
Number obs. 126,312 130,684 135,177 139,260 143,089
YEAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
VARIABLES mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
belong to association 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
lag log total assets 13.18 1.37 13.20 1.38 13.22 1.39 13.21 1.38 13.23 1.40
log total credit last year 7.41 1.59 7.44 1.61 7.44 1.61 7.45 1.60 7.46 1.61
lag log number region industry 4.79 1.32 4.83 1.31 4.86 1.30 4.88 1.29 4.90 1.29
lag log number industry 8.83 1.13 8.87 1.12 8.91 1.12 8.93 1.11 8.95 1.11
lag log number region 8.04 0.71 8.07 0.71 8.11 0.70 8.13 0.70 8.15 0.70
lag number banks used 1.25 0.56 1.25 0.56 1.26 0.56 1.27 0.58 1.25 0.56
lag asset structure 0.50 0.31 0.50 0.31 0.50 0.31 0.51 0.31 0.51 0.31
lag leverage 1.15 1,189.05 6.44 615.68 13.89 3,563.15 9.32 882.38 9.13 1,320.74
lag log age 2.39 0.80 2.39 0.82 2.40 0.82 2.41 0.82 2.43 0.81
lag roa 0.02 9.48 0.00 5.78 -0.07 16.97 -0.07 11.21 0.16 76.63
lag roa std dev 3.13 706.88 1.79 498.13 0.51 53.24 0.60 75.61 0.44 57.11
Number obs. 148,777 155,691 160,267 164,044 167,256
Total number of observations: 1,470,557.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression of credit obtained by associations, by
year
YEAR 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
VARIABLES mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
log credit year bank 8.57 2.22 8.65 2.03 8.61 2.03 8.69 1.96 8.64 2.04
number firms in association 2.19 0.57 2.20 0.60 2.20 0.58 2.20 0.57 2.18 0.51
d members same postal 0.71 0.45 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.74 0.44 0.74 0.44
d members same activity 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.35 0.48
number banks used 1.65 1.37 1.46 1.01 1.44 0.99 1.43 0.96 1.43 0.98
d no direct credit 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
d created association before 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.36 0.20 0.40
lag log avg assets 15.52 2.07 15.41 1.95 15.40 1.90 15.44 1.85 15.40 1.84
lag assoc asset structure 0.47 0.21 0.47 0.21 0.47 0.21 0.46 0.22 0.47 0.21
lag d members use same bank 0.63 0.48 0.60 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.59 0.49
lag log avg age 2.83 0.57 2.84 0.55 2.86 0.52 2.90 0.50 2.90 0.51
lag avg roa 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.20 -0.15 6.53 0.02 0.16
Number of obs. 1841 1679 1605 1559 1632
YEAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
VARIABLES mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
log credit year bank 8.59 2.13 8.56 2.14 8.51 2.23 8.60 2.04 8.61 2.00
number firms in association 2.17 0.48 2.19 0.59 2.18 0.56 2.18 0.61 2.19 0.62
d members same postal 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45
d members same activity 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46
number banks used 1.38 0.89 1.38 0.92 1.38 0.93 1.34 0.90 1.32 0.79
d no direct credit 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03
d created association before 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48
lag log avg assets 15.41 1.84 15.37 1.75 15.37 1.73 15.34 1.71 15.38 1.75
lag assoc asset struc 0.46 0.22 0.46 0.22 0.46 0.23 0.48 0.23 0.48 0.23
lag d members use same bank 0.58 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.57 0.49 0.56 0.50
lag log avg age 2.92 0.52 2.92 0.53 2.93 0.52 2.96 0.52 2.97 0.52
lag avg roa 0.02 0.31 0.00 1.04 0.02 0.11 -0.00 0.66 0.03 0.12
Number of obs. 1628 1649 1620 1535 1501
Total number of observations: 16,249.
4 Results
We start our analysis by estimating Eq. 1 which results are shown in Table 4. We observe
that the size of the firm and its past credit are key elements to determine the likelihood of
a firm to create an association, in terms of both economic and statistical significance. The
higher the credit a firm has obtained the previous year the less its likelihood to create an
association next year, i.e. the higher the past credit a firm obtains the less its probability
to create an association next year, ceteris paribus. This leads to the fact that firms are
more likely to create associations when they have not had access to much credit, implying
that firms might create associations as a mean to substitute the credit they did not obtain
individually.
More explicitly, given that we transform the credit a firm obtained the previous year to
logarithmic in order to account for a decreasing marginal effect of obtaining credit, one unit
increase of the log of a firm’s past year’s credit leads to a decrease of around 31% of the odds
ratio of creating an association the following year, ceteris paribus.9 This is equivalent to
9The odds ratio of creating an association expresses the ratio between the probability that a firm creates
or belongs to an association to the probability it does not, i.e. it equals P (BTAi,t = 1)/(1−P (BTAi,t = 1)).
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state that one percentage increase of a firm’s past year’s credit (of its absolute value and not
of its log) decreases the odds ratio of creating an association the following year by around
0.38%. In other words, one percentage increase of the credit obtained the previous year
decreases the relative probability ratio of creating an association the following year by more
than a third of that percentage, and this holds independently of the value the credit is held
at.10
Odd ratios, even if they may not be interpreted as straightforwardly as probabilities,
present some advantages over marginal effects. Marginal effects of any variable of inter-
est are estimated using specified values of the covariates used in a previously fitted model.
Therefore, modifying the set of covariates (adding or removing a covariate) affects the pre-
dictions of the model which are used to estimate marginal effects, so the estimates obtained
through the marginal effects are dependent on the model specification. This is not the case
when using odds ratios. Besides, marginal effects estimate the effect of a regressor on the
probability of positive outcome of the dependent variable depending on the value the regres-
sor takes, while odd ratios express the constant effect of the variable/predictor of interest
on the outcome of the dependent variable. Therefore, in our case, given that the amount
of credit a firm obtained the previous year is a continuous variable, the odds ratio is con-
stant across values of the amount of credit, while the probabilities obtained thanks to the
marginal effects would not be constant. Thus, if a firm experienced a 1% increase in the
credit it obtained in a given year, its odds ratio of creating an association the following year
are 0.38% lower, independently of the firm’s initial level of credit.
The higher the value of a firm’s assets the higher its likelihood to create an association,
and the absolute amount of a firm’s assets seems to explain better the odds of creating an
association than the proportion of its fixed assets over its total assets. Moreover, in Table 5
where the regression results of estimating Eq. 2 are shown, we observe that bigger firms have
access to higher amounts of credit, and in Table 6 where the regression results of estimating
Eq. 3 are displayed, that the bigger the firms making up the associations the higher the
amount of credit associations get. Thus, bigger firms not only obtain more credit directly
but are also likelier to create associations and the associations they create get on average
more credit allowance than associations made up of smaller firms. Besides, in Appendix B
in Table 10 we provide several estimation results of Eq. 2 considering different sub-samples
of firms according to their SME level, where we show that firms’ size remains a statistically
significant determinant to explain the amount of credit firms get when the sample is only
formed by more similar and comparable firms.
Another insight of the substitution effect between obtaining credit directly or through
an association are the results concerning firms’ age. In Table 4 we observe that older firms
have higher odds of creating an association and in Table 5 that older firms receive less direct
10As credit obtained the previous year is expressed as logarithm, the higher the increase of the credit the
lower it is proportionally its effect on the decrease of the probability to create an association the following
year. Numerically, a 100% increase of the credit obtained last year involves a reduction of 31% on the odds
ratio of creating an association (a net effect of 31% of the credit increase), while a 1% increase implies a
proportionally higher negative effect, namely, a reduction of 0.38% (a net effect of 38% of the credit increase).
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credit. However, in Table 6 the average age of an association’s members is not statistically
significant to explain the credit the association obtains, so we can just conclude that old
firms receive less credit than younger firms and that old firms have higher odds of creating
associations. Old firms, as it is for big firms, are more likely to create associations likely
because they are more established or better known than younger or smaller firms –both by
their commercial partners, by the banks they use and by the market in general, so they make
use of their notoriety to create associations since they benefit from a low adverse selection.
Firms getting credit from many banks are more likely to create associations than firms
using fewer banks for credit purposes (see Table 4). Besides, the higher the number of banks
used by firms the higher the credit they get from each of them on average (see Table 5).
Associations can also obtain credit from more than one source, and as it is shown in Table
6, the higher the number of banks used by an association the higher the amount of credit
it obtains on average from each of them, as it is the case for firms. The positive relation
between the number of lenders and the amount of credit borrowed from each of them might
be due to a signal of firms’ and associations’ high solvency to secure the repayment of every
loan (Ogawa et al. (2007)), which might increase the amount each bank grants it.
Highly leveraged firms are not statistically more likely to create associations than firms
with different debt ratios (see Table 4). Then, the level of debt does not seem to affect a
firm’s likelihood to look for alternative credit incomes such as the creation of an association.
Regarding the credit associations get (see Table 6), we observe that associations using a
bank which all its members use get on average more credit than when not all its members
use the bank (16.6% more). Thus, the supplementary information banks obtain by dealing
directly with every firm making up the association reduces the information asymmetry be-
tween both parties and, as we see, banks provide on average higher amount of credit to the
association when it is also a direct lender of each of its members.
If none of the members of an association has obtained any direct credit during the year
in which they belong to the association, that association gets on average less credit than
otherwise, even if the negative effect decreases with the average size of the association’s
members, i.e. the negative effect of not having access to credit on its own is more severe for
smaller firms. Not having any direct credit implies that every firm creating the association
has faced difficulties obtaining credit signaling lack of creditworthiness or that they do not
need much credit, so in either case we would expect the association they create to obtain
less credit than otherwise.
We do not find any statistically significant effect of the variable accounting for whether
at least one member of an association has created another association by the time they form
an association.
As expected, the higher the number of members in an association the higher the credit
awarded to that association since the amount has to be divided among more members. Be-
sides, if every member of an association is located in the same region (defined as the first
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two digits of the postal code) the association receives on average more credit (around 20%
more) than otherwise. This positive effect might arise because it results easier to the bank
to monitor the members of the association given that they all are located physically close to
each other. Besides, the geographical proximity between firms might reduce adverse selection
to form an association, since firms’ owners might know each other better if their firms are
located within a low distance to each other.11 If the bank’s loan officer is aware of the fact
that an association’s members might know each other better than the members of another
association, the bank’s loan officer might assign a lower probability of default to the loan
and thus concede more credit to the former. This idea is reinforced by the fact that the
majority of associations are formed by firms within the same region (see Table 1), implying
that the physical proximity between firms is a key factor to form associations.
In order to conduct some robustness checks of the results presented so far, we estimate
the aforementioned equations using different samples where we group firms in terms of their
characteristics. For instance, Eq. 2 is estimated considering only micro firms, small firms,
medium firms and big firms separately (see Appendix B Table 10). The difference between
the different levels is done considering firms’ number of employees and turnover or balance
sheet total amount, as defined by the European Commission’s factors to determine the
eligibility of a firm into different levels of SME.12 Besides, Eq. 1 is estimated distinguishing
firms depending on to which group of SME they belong to and also depending on their level
of assets, i.e. we group firms belonging to the same assets quartiles and estimate Eq. 1
considering uniquely these groups of firms. We use firms’ assets quartiles in addition to their
SME level in this case because this way we can use many more observations for each group
(see Table 12 and Table 13 in Appendix D.) However, we do not provide any estimation
result of Eq. 3 using different sub-samples composed of associations which members belong
to a given SME level or to a given assets quartile because the low number of observations
by group and year that results from this decomposition is too low to provide significant and
reliable results.
4.1 Creation of associations over time
Both the number of new loans awarded to firms and associations follow a similar trend. The
number of new loans awarded to firms monotonically increases from the year 2003 until 2008
to later decrease from 2008 until 2011. Similarly, the number of new loans awarded to asso-
ciations soars from 2002 until 2006 where it reaches its peak and then it decreases from 2006
until 2010. Nevertheless, the average amount of credit of the newly conceded loans to firms
during the first year the loans are granted, is negatively related to the number of associations
created during that year. On the one hand, we observe in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 that from 2003
to 2006 the average loan’s amount to firms decreases while the number of new associations
11For instance, Petersen and Rajan (2002) show that firms with opaque information have lenders geograph-
ically closer to them than otherwise, and Berger et al. (2005) state that the less the distance between the
lender and the firm the less the bank’s cost of obtaining soft information. Thus, firms located geographically
close to each other might also have an easier access to each other’s soft information than otherwise.
12The eligibility criteria is shown in Appendix B in Table 9.
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Table 4: Estimation results of Eq. 1. Firms’ likelihood to create associations.
(1)
VARIABLES belong to association
log total credit last year -0.378***
(0.01)
L.log total assets 1.107***
(0.01)
L.log number region industry 0.042
(0.03)
L.log number region -0.667***
(0.20)
L.log number industry 1.043***
(0.07)

















Number of firms 265,395
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. “L.” means that the variable is lagged by
one year. The term “lnsig2u” is the log of the variance due to time level variation (panel variation). Time, industry and region
fixed effects are included.
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Table 5: Firms’ obtained direct credit. Estimation results of Eq. 2. In columns (1) and (2)
estimation results using Fixed-Effect (FE) and Between-Effects (BE) are shown, respectively.
(1) (2)
credit firms fe credit firms be
VARIABLES log credit year bank log credit year bank
BTA hat -18.08*** -36.81***
(0.127) (0.061)
L.log number region industry 0.06*** 0.08***
(0.012) (0.004)
L.log number region -0.11*** -0.94***
(0.041) (0.060)
L.log number industry 0.36*** 0.91***
(0.018) (0.020)
L.number banks used 0.44*** 0.62***
(0.005) (0.003)




L.log total assets 1.21*** 1.96***
(0.006) (0.003)










Number of firm-bank pairs 360,490 360,490
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses. “L.” means that the variable is
lagged by one year. Time, industry and region fixed effects are included.
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Table 6: Credit associations obtain. Estimation results of Eq. 3. In columns (1) and (2)
estimation results using Fixed-Effect (FE) and Between-Effects (BE) are shown, respectively.
(1) (2)
credit assoc fe credit assoc be
VARIABLES log credit year bank log credit year bank
d no direct credit -6.528*** -15.551***
(2.40) (3.98)
L.log avg assets 0.472*** 0.513***
(0.09) (0.02)
d no direct credit#L.log avg assets 0.303** 0.830***
(0.12) (0.23)
d created association before - -0.077
(0.06)
L.assoc asset structure 0.170 0.397***
(0.20) (0.12)
L.d members use same bank -0.025 0.166***
(0.05) (0.05)
L.number banks used 0.116** 0.249***
(0.05) (0.03)
number firms in association - 0.320***
(0.04)
d members same activity - 0.046
(0.05)
d members same postal - 0.206***
(0.05)
L.log avg age -0.262 -0.060
(0.25) (0.05)






Number of association-bank pairs 5,311 5,311
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. “L.” means that the variable is lagged by
one year; “d ” means that the variable is a dummy. Time, industry and region fixed effects are included.
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rises.13 On the other hand, from 2006 to 2009 the average loan’s amount to firms increases
while the number of associations created decreases over that period. Therefore, we observe
that firms substitute the credit they obtain from banks with the alternative of creating asso-
ciations with other firms; the periods during which the average loan to a firm gets reduced
(increased) coincides with the period where firms create more (less) associations. In Fig. 2
we can observe the evolution of the number of associations created over time, with a clear
trend of an increasing number from the year 2002 until 2006 and a decrease from 2006 on.
Regarding the financial crisis originated in 2008, even if the number of new loans to both
firms and associations decreased after the negative credit supply shock of 2008 (see Fig. 1
and Fig. 2), we observe in Fig. 3 that the average credit awarded to firms considering all the
ongoing loans and not only the newly granted ones decreased from 2008 until 2011, while
the average credit awarded to every association over that period increased. This result holds
considering the average yearly credit received by firms and associations by every bank and
not only by each single bank. This fact might denote that after the crisis only associations
made up by solvent or creditworthiness firms could have access to credit through associations,
obtaining higher average credit at the expense of associations created by less attractive firms
which credit applications were rejected. Then, banks granted fewer number of new loans to
associations but with a higher average credit. The reason why the average credit awarded to
associations increases is not due to an average increase of the number of participants in each
association, since the average number of firms constituting an association remains more or
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Number of firms' new loans and their average amount
Figure 1: Number of new loans to firms and their
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number_new_assoc avg_credit_assoc
The yearly average credit amount is calculated considering only the credit the association
obtained over the year it was created
Number of new assoc.and their credit's average amount
Figure 2: Number of new associations created and
the average credit they received. Credit is shown in
thousands of euros.
13Both in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 there is no observation for the year 2001 because even if we observe the
number of active associations in year 2001 we cannot disentangle whether there are associations created in
2001 or if they were created before and they were still active in 2001. Then, the first year in which we can
assure that new associations were created during that year and did not exist before is year 2002.
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year
associations_credit firms_credit
Average yearly credit obtained from each bank
Figure 3: Average yearly credit obtained by firms and associations from each bank. Credit is shown in
thousands of euros.
4.2 Focus on firms creating associations
Firms creating associations obtain on average less direct credit during the time in which they
belong to some association compared to firms that do not belong to any association during
that period. We compare in Fig. 4 the average direct credit obtained by firms creating
associations at some time between 2001 and 2011 when they belong and when they do not
belong to an association, so we now focus on the sub-sample of firms creating at least one
association over time. We observe that the yearly average credit obtained by firms belonging
to an association and the yearly average credit received by firms not belonging to an associ-
ation that year behave in opposite ways over time. Furthermore, the average credit obtained
by firms when they do not belong to an association outweighs firms’ average credit when
they do belong to an association. Therefore, once a firm belongs to an association we observe
that its average direct credit gets reduced compared to the average direct credit of firms not
belonging to an association, implying that firms cut down the amount of credit they get
directly from banks when they get credit through the association they belong to. Moreover,
the lower the direct credit firms obtain when they belong to an association the higher the
credit the firms not belonging to associations get, so we observe that banks shift the supply
of credit from firms which lower their demand for credit when they create associations, to
other firms which do not belong to any association at that time. The only period of time
during which the credit obtained by firms is reduced independently of whether they belong
to an association is over 2008-2010, where after the negative shock of the crisis the average
credit obtained by every firm is reduced for two years in a row.
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year
firm_not_belong_to_assoc firm_belong_to_assoc
Note: Only firms who have created an association at some point in time are considered.
Firms' total direct loans' average amount depending on belonging to an assoc.
Figure 4: Average direct credit obtained by firms when they belong to an association and when they do
not belong to any. Credit is shown in thousands of euros.
We now study the determinants of firms’ access to credit but allowing the fact that firms
may get credit from the same bank the association to which the firm belongs gets credit
from. Then, we further restrict the sample to consider only those firms belonging to an
association for each year under consideration. We estimate a similar equation to Eq. 2 with
the particularity of focusing only on firms which have created associations and considering
the possibility that firms receive direct credit from the same bank as the association to which
they belong does. The new equation we estimate is Eq. 4 and its results are shown in Table
7.
log(crediti,b,t|BTAi,t = 1) = α + β · same banki,t + δ · zi,t−1 + it (4)
We note from Table 7 that when a firm belongs to an association and it also gets credit
directly from the same bank that supplies credit to the association it belongs to, the firm
receives less direct credit (around 26% less) compared to other years in which it belongs to
an association but it does not use the same bank as the association does. This is due tot he
fact that as the bank knows better the firm behind the association, it grants more credit to
the association and therefore the firm demands less direct credit, since the firm substitutes
the credit it needs directly with the credit it obtains through the association. This last fact
is supported by the result in Table 6 where we observe that associations composed of firms
which all use the same bank as the association does receive on average higher amount of
credit (16.6% more) compared to other associations which not all its members get credit
from the same bank as their association does. However, we also note in Table 7 that firms
using the same bank as the association to which they belong uses, receive on average slightly
more credit (around 4% more) than other firms which belong to an association but do not
use its same bank. Thus, firms receive more direct credit than other firms if they use the
same bank as the association to which they belong does, but receive less direct credit during
the years in which they use these banks compared to the credit they get during the years
they do not use these banks.
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Besides, we observe in Table 7 that the number of different banks used by firms positively
affects the amount of credit firms obtain from each bank they use, as it was the case when we
considered every firm in the sample independently of whether they had created an association
(see Table 5). Remind that associations using many banks had also access to higher amounts
of credit than associations using fewer banks (see Table 6, where we noted that for each extra
bank an association used it received on average around 25% more of credit in each loan than
other associations.).
Table 7: Credit firms with FE and BE considering only firms belonging to associations.
Estimation results of Eq. 4. In columns (1) and (2) estimation results using Fixed-Effect
(FE) and Between-Effects (BE) are shown, respectively.
(1) (2)
same bank firm assoc fe same bank firm assoc be
VARIABLES log credit year bank log credit year bank
L.same bank firm assoc -0.26*** 0.04**
(0.043) (0.018)
L.log number region industry 0.10 0.03
(0.074) (0.021)
L.log number region 0.65*** 0.33
(0.250) (0.282)
L.log number industry -0.17 0.17*
(0.111) (0.096)
L.number banks used 0.02* 0.06***
(0.013) (0.009)




L.log total assets 0.51*** 0.52***
(0.022) (0.006)










Number of firm-bank pairs 44,059 44,059
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. Time, industry and region fixed effects are
included.
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higher amounts of credit. According to the data, only a minority of associations are formed
by firms sharing a common ownership, but within this sample and in the majority of asso-
ciations made up by two firms, one firm fully controls the other.
In fact, only around 5% of associations have at least one member which holds shares of at
least another member, and in 60% of the cases within this subset of associations of common
ownership, half the members of an association hold shares of the other half of the members.
Besides, focusing on associations created by just two firms where one holds shares of the
other, in 75% of the cases one of the firms holds more than 50% of the shares of the other,
that is, it fully controls the other firm.14
In order to analyze whether associations formed by common-ownership firms receive
higher amounts of credit due to the lower adverse selection these associations may represent,
we estimate the following equation 5:
log(credita,b,t) = α + β · same ownershipa,t + δ · za,t−1 + at, (5)
where same ownership is the variable accounting for whether there is common ownership
within an association.
Given that we have access to Belgian firms’ ownership structure, we create two different
ownership variables that assess whether a firm holds shares of another firm. We first use an
indicator variable that states whether at least one firm within an association has equity of
at least another firm it creates an association with. Second, we create a continuous variable
which states the proportion of firms which hold shares of other firms within an association.
That is, if an association is formed by just 2 firms and both firms have shares of the other
firm, the proportion of firms with shares of other firms within the association equals a 100%,
and if there are three firms and two of them have shares of the other two, the proportion
equals 66%. Thus, we estimate two equations where different ownership variables are used.
As the two variables of interest are not statistically significant in the regressions’ results,
the two estimations’ outputs are shown in Appendix E in Table 15.
Thus, it seems that forming an association together with co-owned firms does not statis-
tically affect the amount of credit these associations get compared to associations formed by
independently owned firms.
Further, we study the fact that associations made up by co-owned firms may obtain
14In 55% of the cases where an association is created by two firms where one hold shares of the other, one
of the firms keeps more than 90% of the shares of the other firm; in 35% of the cases one of the firms keeps
more than 99% of the shares of the other firm; and in 10% of the cases one of the firms keeps exactly 100%
of the shares of the other firm.
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much direct credit over the past year and that they reduce the amount of direct credit
they obtain during the time they belong to an association. Therefore, firms try to obtain
credit through alternative ways when they do not obtain credit directly and they reduce the
amount of direct credit they get when they find other sources of credit, implying that firms
substitute the credit they directly get from banks for the credit they obtain when they create
associations. Besides, we show that associations which members do not have access to any
direct credit receive less credit than otherwise, the effect being more severe for associations
made up by small firms, either because they do not need much credit or because they face
financial constrains which make the risk contamination outweigh any financial coinsurance
that could emerge when they pool together to create an association. We also find that big
firms create more associations and get higher amounts of credit than associations made up
by smaller firms. Old firms are also more likely to create associations compared to younger
firms and we observe that old firms receive on average less direct credit than younger firms.
Associations get more credit if all its members use the same bank the association uses to
get credit from, implying that if banks know better their debtors and have access to extra
information about them they lend on average higher amounts of credit. Furthermore, if
firms creating an association are geographically close to each other the association receives
higher amounts of credit than otherwise due to the lower adverse selection the members of
the association represent. Besides, we find no evidence that associations created by firms
which hold equity of each other have access to higher amounts of credit than associations
made up by independently owned firms.
5 Conclusions
We have studied firms’ incentives to create associations as an alternative way of obtaining
credit. We show that firms are more likely to create associations when they have not obtained
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Appendix
A Definition of variables
Definitions of variables mentioned in Table 2 and Table 3 are provided in the following Table
8:
Table 8: Definition of variables described in Table 2 and Table 3
Firms’ variables Definition
belong to association dummy=1 if a firm belongs to an association (=0 otherwise)
lag log total assets lag of a firm’s total assets (in logarithm)
log total credit last year total credit a firm obtained the previous year (in log)
lag log number region industry lag of the number of firms within a firm’s region and industry (in log)
lag log number industry lag of the number of firms within a firm’s industry (in log)
lag log number region lag of the number of firms within a firm’s region (in log)
lag number banks used lag of the number of banks a firm uses
lag asset structure lag of a firm’s asset structure (fixed assets / total assets)
lag leverage lag of a firm’s leverage (total liabilities / equity)
lag log age lag of a firm’s age (in log)
lag roa lag of a firm’s return on assets
lag roa std dev lag of the standard deviation of a firm’s return on assets
over the period 2001-2011
Associations’ variables Definition
log credit year bank credit obtained by an association in a given year from a given bank (in log)
number firms in association number of firms (members) which create an association
d members same postal dummy=1 if every member has the same postal code (=0 otherwise)
d members same activity dummy=1 if every member has the same activity code (=0 otherwise)
number banks used number of banks used by an association
d no direct credit dummy=1 if no member obtained credit directly (=0 otherwise)
d created association before dummy=1 if at least one member has created an association
in any previous year (=0 otherwise)
lag log avg assets lag of members’ average assets (in log)
lag assoc asset structure lag of members’ average asset structure (fixed assets / total assets)
lag d members use same bank lag of dummy=1 if every member uses the same bank (=0 otherwise)
lag log avg age lag of members’ average age (in log)
lag avg roa lag of members’ average return on assets
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Table 9: Firm characteristics to define their SME category level.
Firm category Employees Turnover or Balance sheet total
Large ≥ 250 > e50 m or > e43 m
Medium < 250 ≤ e50 m or ≤ e43 m
Small < 50 ≤ e10 m or ≤ e10 m
Micro < 10 ≤ e2 m or ≤ e2 m
Source: European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/
facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm.
is established considering firms’ number of employees and turnover or balance sheet total
(see Table 9). Results obtained are qualitatively the same to the results obtained in Table 5
where no distinction in the pooled sample was made. A fact to mention, however, is that
the number of different banks used plays a role of different magnitude depending on the
sample of firms used. The effect is economically more relevant the larger the firms considered
in the set. This difference might be due to the fact that small firms rely on soft information
in their relation with their lenders due to their lack of hard information (Berger et al. (2005)),
so the higher the number of sources a micro or small firm uses the lower the value of the
private information the creditor might have (Cole (1998)) and the lower the bank’s monopoly
power gained through its informational advantage (Degryse and Ongena (2001)). Therefore,
the positive effect is lower than the one observed for large firms. Besides, the literature
recognizes that smaller firms use less sources than bigger firms. Petersen and Rajan (1994)
for the US market, Harhoff and Korting (1998) for the German one and Farinha and Santos
(2002) for the Portuguese one state that small firms generally have a single relationship with
their lenders, and that the number of sources used increases with firms’ size.
B Firm characteristics to determine their SME level
In Table 9 firms’ necessary characteristics to belong to each of the SME category levels are
shown.
In the following Table 10 we show different regression results focusing on different samples
to estimate Eq. 2 under two different estimation strategies. We consider a reduced sample
of firms for each regression to study the determinants of credit when only similar firms in
terms of belonging to the same level of SME classification are considered. The level of SME
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1704
Table 10: Firms’ obtained direct credit estimating Eq. 2 considering micro, small, medium
and large firms separately. Estimates in columns (1)-(4) are obtained using OLS with fixed-
effects while in columns (5)-(8) OLS with between-effects is used. In columns (1) and (4)
only micro firms are considered; in columns (2) and (5) only small firms are considered; in
columns (3) and (7) only medium firms are considered and in columns (4) and (8) only large
firms are considered.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
sme1 fe sme2 fe sme3 fe sme4 fe sme1 be sme2 be sme3 be sme4 be
VARIABLES log credit log credit log credit log credit log credit log credit log credit log credit
BTA hat -14.85*** -21.60*** -20.57*** -20.99*** -35.12*** -38.26*** -39.06*** -35.26***
(0.180) (0.598) (1.188) (1.483) (0.092) (0.303) (0.583) (1.162)
L.log number region industry 0.06*** 0.13*** 0.12 -0.11 0.07*** 0.05** 0.12** -0.01
(0.017) (0.041) (0.090) (0.202) (0.005) (0.020) (0.049) (0.154)
L.log number region -0.31*** -0.20 -0.32 -0.16 -1.14*** -0.97*** 0.45 5.32**
(0.057) (0.173) (0.462) (1.198) (0.074) (0.340) (0.882) (2.363)
L.log number industry 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.59*** 0.89*** 0.87*** 0.95*** 0.77** 1.17*
(0.028) (0.077) (0.185) (0.295) (0.028) (0.127) (0.324) (0.652)
L.number banks used 0.27*** 0.58*** 0.65*** 0.76*** 0.43*** 0.76*** 0.98*** 1.09***
(0.007) (0.020) (0.040) (0.058) (0.004) (0.011) (0.021) (0.039)
L.asset structure 0.98*** 0.89*** 0.71*** 0.47 1.43*** 1.35*** 1.28*** 1.64***
(0.013) (0.052) (0.153) (0.341) (0.008) (0.045) (0.127) (0.329)
L.leverage 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00** -0.00** 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.log total assets 1.10*** 1.27*** 1.19*** 1.30*** 1.93*** 2.02*** 2.00*** 1.66***
(0.008) (0.031) (0.075) (0.132) (0.004) (0.017) (0.039) (0.084)
L.log age -0.32*** -0.46*** -0.34* -0.99** -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.23*** -0.07
(0.011) (0.049) (0.192) (0.434) (0.003) (0.014) (0.036) (0.082)
L.roa -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.09 -0.09 -0.00*** 0.02 -0.03 -0.52**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.118) (0.347) (0.000) (0.021) (0.252) (0.225)
L.roa std dev - - - - 0.00*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.43
(0.000) (0.006) (0.046) (0.313)
Constant -6.47*** -9.10*** -9.06** -11.37 -14.01*** -17.78*** -29.42*** -71.45***
(0.512) (1.571) (3.847) (11.132) (0.738) (3.410) (9.152) (23.540)
Observations 635,396 101,471 24,843 9,117 635,396 101,471 24,843 9,117
R-squared 0.185 0.151 0.152 0.160 0.655 0.512 0.577 0.583
Number of firm-bank pairs 158,197 22,247 5,275 1,986 158,197 22,247 5,275 1,986
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time, industry and region fixed
effects are included.
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Table 11: Hausman test comparing fixed-effects and random-effects when estimating Eq. 2.
Time, industry and region fixed effects are included.
Coefficients
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V b-V B))
fixed random Difference S.E.
BTA hat -18,0764 -24,008 5,931626 0,022698
L.log number region industry 0,05841 0,059924 -0,00151 0,007713
L.log number region -0,11107 -0,43113 0,320062 0,010477
L.log number industry 0,357987 0,560863 -0,20288 0,008093
L.number banks used 0,436805 0,514325 -0,07752 0,001283
L.asset structure 0,904715 1,157038 -0,25232 0,003721
L.leverage 9,08E-06 1,22E-05 -3,15E-06 4,36E-08
L.log total assets 1,212115 1,464979 -0,25286 0,001745
L.log age -0,4022 -0,33296 -0,06925 0,004821
L.roa -0,00022 -0,00023 1,42E-05 7,72E-06
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg.
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(18) = (b− B)′[(V b− V B)−1](b− B)
= 112504.43
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
C Hausman
In this section we show the Hausman test’s result to see whether there are significant dif-
ferences between the coefficients estimated using fixed-effects and random-effects when es-
timating Eq. 2. We observe that we can reject the null hypotheses that both regressions’
coefficients are not different at 1% significance level.
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Table 12: Probability to create associations grouping firms into different assets quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logit q1 logit q2 logit q3 logit q4
VARIABLES belong to assoc belong to assoc belong to assoc belong to assoc
log total credit last year -0.250*** -0.353*** -0.336*** -0.150***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
L.log total assets 0.903*** 0.897*** 0.564*** 0.388***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00)
L.log number region industry 0.078*** 0.005 0.020 0.047***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
L.log number region -0.546 -0.402 -0.844*** -0.730***
(0.35) (0.25) (0.22) (0.17)
L.log number industry -0.214* 0.239*** 0.107 0.215***
(0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06)
L.number banks used 0.333*** 0.288*** 0.296*** 0.285***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
L.asset structure 0.590*** 0.734*** 0.726*** 0.230***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
L.leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.log age 0.018 -0.021** -0.050*** -0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
L.roa -0.000 -0.024*** -0.384*** -0.311***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04)
L.roa std dev -0.000 0.000* -0.001 0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -7.191** -10.683*** -1.373 -2.266
(3.41) (2.44) (2.17) (1.64)
Observations 367,210 367,470 367,481 367,250
Total number of observations: 1,469,411. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard
errors in parentheses. Time, industry and region fixed effects are included.
D Estimations of Eq. 1 using different samples
In this section we provide results derived from estimating Eq. 1 considering different samples
according to firms’ assets quartiles (see table 12) and firms’ SME levels (see Table 13). The
results obtained for each sub-sample are qualitatively the same to the results obtained when
we considered the entire sample (see Table 4) except for the sub-sample made up of firms
which are classified as SME=4 (Table 13, column (4)), mainly due to the low number of
observations considered in that sub-sample. Furthermore, when we divide the firms in terms
of their assets so we can have a higher number of observations, we see that the results
corresponding to large firms (Table 12, column (4)) are more in line with the other results
-in terms of coefficients’ sign and their statistical significance.
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Table 13: Probability to create associations grouping firms into SME levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logit sme1 logit sme2 logit sme3 logit sme4
VARIABLES belong to assoc belong to assoc belong to assoc belong to assoc
log total credit last year -0.357*** -0.209*** -0.099*** 0.030*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
L.log total assets 0.673*** 0.467*** 0.373*** 0.368***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
L.log number region industry 0.007 0.031 0.166*** 0.765***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.13)
L.log number region -0.442** 0.232 -2.174*** 1.106
(0.20) (0.42) (0.79) (1.54)
L.log number industry 0.289*** 0.267 -0.933*** -1.478***
(0.07) (0.17) (0.30) (0.51)
L.number banks used 0.318*** 0.259*** 0.087*** 0.037
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
L.asset structure 1.044*** 0.543*** 0.742*** 1.213***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.12) (0.22)
L.leverage 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.log age -0.046*** -0.090*** -0.158*** 0.154**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
L.roa -0.000 -0.837*** -0.182 -0.397
(0.00) (0.13) (0.24) (0.32)
L.roa std dev -0.000 0.007 -1.647*** -0.041
(0.00) (0.01) (0.35) (0.23)
Constant -8.188*** -11.893*** 21.294*** -14.291
(1.95) (4.19) (8.05) (15.36)
Observations 548,019 59,622 12,256 3,583
Total number of observations: 623,480. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors
in parentheses. Time, industry and region fixed effects are included.
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Table 14: Descriptive statistics of the two associations’ common ownership variables used in Eq. 5 and
estimated in Table 15, by year
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
VARIABLES mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
form association 0.60 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.56 0.50
proportion owners 31.91 28.36 31.03 28.71 30.98 29.10 31.22 29.36 29.97 29.36
Number of obs. 1841 1679 1605 1559 1632
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
VARIABLES mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
form association 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
proportion owners 28.93 29.91 28.23 29.89 26.82 29.22 26.96 29.29 26.52 28.95
Number of obs. 1628 1649 1620 1535 1501
Total number of observations: 16,249.
We observe in Table 15 that our variables of interest regarding firms’ common ownership
are not statistically significant.
E Same ownership
In Table 14 we provide descriptive statistics of the two associations’ common ownership
variables used in Eq. 5. Descriptive statistics of the rest of the variables used in Eq. 5 are
provided in the main text in Table 3. The categorical variable “form association” indicates
whether at least one firm within an association has shares of at least another firm within
the same association, and the variable “proportion owners” shows the proportion of firms
within an association which hold shares of other firms within the same association.
In the following Table 15 estimation results of Eq. 5 using uniquely the Between Effect
(BE) approach are shown (comparison across associations). The Fixed Effects approach
(comparison within associations) is not used since the two variables’ of interest values,
“form association” and “proportion owners”, do not vary within each association, and there-
fore their estimated coefficients’ values would be omitted.
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Table 15: Credit associations obtain. Estimation results of Eq. 5. In columns (1) and (2)
estimation results using Between-Effects (BE) are shown.
(1) (2)
credit assoc be credit assoc be
VARIABLES log credit year bank log credit year bank
form association 0.066 -
(0.05)
proportion owners - 0.001
(0.00)
d no direct credit -15.580*** -15.585***
(3.98) (3.98)
L.log avg assets 0.509*** 0.509***
(0.02) (0.02)
d no direct credit#L.log avg assets 0.831*** 0.832***
(0.23) (0.23)
d created association before -0.078 -0.078
(0.06) (0.06)
L.assoc asset structure 0.378*** 0.377***
(0.12) (0.12)
L.d members use same bank 0.167*** 0.166***
(0.05) (0.05)
L.number banks used 0.248*** 0.248***
(0.03) (0.03)
number firms in association 0.312*** 0.316***
(0.04) (0.04)
d members same activity 0.045 0.046
(0.05) (0.05)
d members same postal 0.203*** 0.204***
(0.05) (0.05)
L.log avg age -0.067 -0.067
(0.05) (0.05)






Number of association-bank pairs 5,311 5,311
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. Time, industry and region fixed effects are
included.
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